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Supervisory Information and the 
Frequency of Bank Examinations
Beverly J. Hirtle and Jose A. Lopez
ank supervisors need timely and reliable infor-
mation about the financial condition and risk
profile of banks in order to conduct effective
supervision. Although such information can be
obtained in part from regulatory reports and public disclo-
sures, a key source is the on-site bank examination. Bank
examinations enable supervisors to confirm the accuracy of
information in regulatory reports. More important, perhaps,
the examinations allow supervisors to gather confidential
information about banks’ financial conditions and to assess
qualitative attributes, such as internal controls and risk
management procedures, that affect bank risk profiles. 
Such confidential information may be valuable to
supervisors, yet it is costly to obtain: bank examinations
absorb considerable resources on the part of supervisors as
well as banks. Thus, supervisors face a trade-off between the
timeliness of the information gathered from bank examina-
tions and the costs of obtaining it. In particular, the longer
the time since a bank’s most recent examination, the higher
the likelihood that conditions at the bank will have
changed in a way that diminishes the current value of that
information. This concern must be balanced against the
costs of conducting more frequent examinations.
The potential “time decay” of bank examination
information has been a concern for both supervisors and
policymakers. Supervisors have developed a number of
approaches for allocating scarce examination resources,
including off-site monitoring systems to help identify
banks whose financial conditions may have deteriorated.
Concern about the timeliness of examination information
also motivated provisions in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), which
mandates annual on-site examinations for most commercial
banks. In this case, legislators felt that frequent examina-
tions would be useful in limiting losses to the deposit
insurance system.
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In this article, we provide insight into the policy
aspects of this informational time decay by assessing how
the length of time between bank examinations affects the
quality of information available to supervisors. For these
purposes, we define the quality of information in terms of
how accurately the information from a prior examination
reflects the current condition of a bank. Our analysis
assumes that examination information incorporates two
types of data: information available from public sources
and updated regulatory reports, and private supervisory
information gathered from on-site examinations. That is,
examination findings contain information that is readily
available from public financial and regulatory reports as
well as private information that can be obtained only
through on-site examinations, such as confidential infor-
mation about a bank’s troubled assets or the examiner’s
assessment of a bank’s internal controls. Changes over time
in the quality of the examination information will be
affected by changes in both of these components.
Because the information in regulatory reports is
readily available to supervisors, an on-site examination is not
required to update this component.1 However, supervisory
information can be acquired only through an examination.
Thus, the rate of decay in the accuracy of this private
supervisory information should be the key determinant in
the timing of bank examinations. The faster this informa-
tion decays over time, the more frequent these examina-
tions must be to ensure that the quality of information
does not drop below some critical level.
Our analysis suggests that the private supervisory
component of examination information ceases to provide
useful information about the current condition of a bank
after six to twelve quarters, or one and a half to three years.
This rate of information decay seems to be cyclical, in that
the quality of this private supervisory information appears
to decay faster during years in which the U.S. banking
industry experiences financial difficulties. Consistent with
this finding, our analysis further suggests that the decay
rate depends on the initial financial condition of the bank:
the rate of decay in the quality of private supervisory
information appears to be significantly greater for troubled
banks than for healthy ones. This latter result is consistent
with the idea that conditions change more rapidly at insti-
tutions experiencing financial difficulty and that more fre-
quent examinations of these institutions may be warranted.
Our results provide insight into how often a bank
should be examined. The range of six to twelve quarters
indicated by our results is really an upper bound, since it
reflects the point at which the supervisory information
from the previous examination contains no useful informa-
tion about the current condition of the bank.2 As a matter
of practice, it is probably desirable to examine banks some-
what more frequently—that is, when the supervisory infor-
mation from the previous examination still contains some
useful information about the bank’s current condition. Our
results also suggest that more frequent examinations may
be warranted during periods of banking industry stress and
for banks that are financially troubled. Taken together,
these results imply that the annual examination frequency
mandated in FDICIA is reasonable, particularly during
times of financial difficulties for the banking industry.
THE TIMING AND FREQUENCY 
OF BANK EXAMINATIONS
The timing and frequency of bank examinations have
received increased public scrutiny in recent years, espe-
cially in light of the significant loan losses and number of
bank failures suffered by the U.S. banking industry during
the 1980s and early 1990s.3 Debate has centered around
the idea that supervisors, banks, and the tax-paying public
face a trade-off between the costs and benefits of more
frequent examinations. On the one hand, more frequent
examinations would generate more timely information
about the current condition of banks and could allow
supervisors to address emerging problems more quickly.
This quicker response could reduce the exposure of the
deposit insurance system—and ultimately the taxpayer—
to loss. On the other hand, examinations are resource-
intensive for both banks and supervisors, and maintaining
large supervisory and examination staffs can be costly.4
The balance of this trade-off has shifted over the
years in response to conditions in the banking industry. For
instance, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation recently
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agencies to extend the examination cycle as a means of
reducing the size of their examination staffs, especially
during the early-to-mid-1980s (Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation 1997). According to the report, these agencies
focused their resources on the institutions most likely to
present systemic risk concerns. In many cases, targeted or
limited-scope examinations—that is, examinations that
assess only selected bank activities or that involve less
detailed evaluations of a bank’s overall activities, respec-
tively—were used in place of more resource-intensive,
full-scope examinations. As a result, the frequency of full-
scope examinations fell considerably during this period,
especially for smaller banks and banks believed to be in
sound financial condition. Taken together, such measures in
particular allowed the FDIC and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency to reduce their examination staffs. 
The FDIC report concluded that such cutbacks in
examination staffs “reduced the ability of supervisors to
detect problems early enough to take corrective actions.”5
As a result, state and federal banking supervisors increased
their examination staffs and conducted bank examinations
more frequently, on average, as problems in the banking
industry increased through the latter part of the 1980s. As
these problems intensified, the issue of the frequency and
scope of bank examinations increasingly became part of the
public policy debate. This process culminated in the
passage of FDICIA, which mandates full-scope, on-site
examinations each year for U.S. commercial banks.6
In general, bank examinations are scheduled at
least several months in advance, both to give banks time to
prepare and to allow supervisors to develop an overall
schedule and individual examination plans that make
efficient use of available resources. Given this advanced
scheduling, changing the timing of one examination
typically also entails rescheduling others to free up the
needed resources. Thus, several factors work to reinforce
the timing implicit in the original examination schedule.
However, even after the passage of FDICIA, supervisors
continue to have some discretion over the timing of exami-
nations for individual banks. To some extent, the size and
perceived condition of a bank can influence the planned
time between full-scope examinations, but there is now less
scope for supervisors to lengthen this time period without
violating FDICIA’s annual examination requirement.
Supervisors can and do accelerate full-scope examinations
and undertake targeted examinations if other factors indicate
that problems are developing at a particular bank. In fact,
supervisors employ fairly extensive off-site monitoring
procedures—including the use of statistical models—to help
identify those banks where problems might be emerging.7
THE CAMEL RATING SYSTEM
A key outcome of an examination is a supervisory rating of
the bank’s overall financial condition. For the purposes of
this article, we focus on these supervisory ratings—known
as CAMEL ratings—as a proxy for the information resulting
from a bank examination. CAMEL ratings, which are
assigned by examiners at the conclusion of an examination,
are numerical ratings of the quality of a bank’s financial
condition, risk profile, and overall performance. This rating
system is used by the three federal banking supervisors—
the OCC, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve—as well as
by the Office of Thrift Supervision, the National Credit
Union Administration, and state banking supervisors to
provide a convenient summary rating of each bank’s condi-
tion at the time of the examination. In addition, CAMEL
ratings are increasingly being used for other supervisory
purposes, such as setting deposit insurance rates and expe-
diting bank applications for various regulatory purposes.
The acronym CAMEL refers to the five components
of a bank’s condition assessed by examiners: Capital ade-
quacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity.8
Ratings are assigned for each component, and a composite
CAMEL ratings, which are assigned by 
examiners at the conclusion of an examination, 
are numerical ratings of the quality of a bank’s 
financial condition, risk profile, and overall 
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rating is assigned for the overall condition and performance
of the bank. These component and composite ratings are
assigned on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 representing the high-
est rating (strongest performance) and 5 representing the
lowest (weakest performance). Banks with composite
CAMEL ratings of 1 or 2 are generally considered to
present few, if any, significant supervisory concerns, while
those with ratings of 3, 4, or 5 are considered to present
moderate to extreme degrees of supervisory concern.9
The CAMEL rating is only one aspect of the infor-
mation produced during a bank examination. Examiners
also put together a detailed report that describes the bank’s
activities and management structure; assesses the bank’s
performance along the dimensions reflected in the CAMEL
rating as well as in other areas; and, where appropriate,
contains recommendations for changes and improvements
in the bank’s policies and procedures. This report is backed
by extensive examination work papers detailing the process
leading to the examiners’ conclusions. The CAMEL rating,
while not a comprehensive indicator of all this information,
nonetheless provides a convenient summary measure of the
examination findings.
All of this examination material, including the
CAMEL rating, is highly confidential. A bank’s CAMEL
rating is known only by the bank’s senior management and
appropriate supervisory staff at the relevant supervisory
agencies. CAMEL ratings are never made publicly avail-
able, even on a lagged basis. Thus, to a considerable
degree, the CAMEL rating reflects the private supervisory
information gathered during a bank examination as well
as whatever public and regulatory information is available
about the bank’s condition. For this reason, we use the
ratings as our indicator of the private supervisory informa-
tion arising from bank examinations.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE INFORMATION 
IN CAMEL RATINGS
Other researchers have examined the role of CAMEL ratings
in providing information about the financial condition of
banks. For instance, Berger and Davies (1994) examine the
information content of CAMEL ratings by testing for stock
price reactions when new ratings are assigned. Despite the
fact that CAMEL ratings are confidential, the authors find
that rating downgrades seem to lead to negative excess
stock returns. They interpret this result as evidence that
examinations generate valuable private information and
that rating downgrades reveal unfavorable private informa-
tion about bank conditions. Similarly, DeYoung, Flannery,
Lang, and Sorescu (1998) find that CAMEL ratings contain
information useful to the market for subordinated, bank
holding company debt.
Berger, Davies, and Flannery (1998) find that
BOPEC ratings—the supervisory ratings given to bank
holding companies—contain information about bank con-
ditions that goes beyond the information in market data,
such as bond-rating downgrades.10 In particular, they find
that supervisory data and market information Granger-
cause (or are useful in forecasting) one another, suggesting
that both supervisors and the financial markets have some
unique information. Finally, Barker and Holdsworth (1993)
find evidence that CAMEL ratings are significant predictors
of bank failure, even after controlling for a wide range of
publicly available information about the condition and per-
formance of banks. Taken together, these papers suggest that
supervisory ratings contain information about the condition
and performance of banks that is not available to the public.
These papers suggest that newly assigned CAMEL
ratings contain relevant information. Some researchers have
also studied how that relevance changes over time. For
example, Gilbert (1993) addresses the issue to some extent
by finding that more frequent examinations reduced losses
to the Bank Insurance Fund, which covers government
losses when a bank fails. Cole and Gunther (1995, 1998)
A bank’s CAMEL rating is known only by 
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find that the information contained in CAMEL ratings
decays quickly with respect to predicting bank failure
from 1986 to 1992. In particular, they find that a model
using publicly available financial data is a better indicator
of the likelihood of bank failure than the previous CAMEL
rating is once the rating is more than one or two quarters
old. These two studies address the issue of information
decay directly; however, the primary purpose of CAMEL
ratings is not to identify future bank failures, but to
provide an assessment of banks’ overall conditions at the
time of the examinations.
Focusing on this aspect of supervisory ratings,
Berger, Davies, and Flannery (1998) examine BOPEC rat-
ings in relation to market-based data and find that only
very recent examinations provide useful information. The
information appears to become much less useful, or “stale,”
over time. In our analysis, we focus directly on the time
decay of the supervisory information in CAMEL ratings
and the decay’s impact on assessing the current condition
of a bank. Thus, we view our article as complementary to,
and an extension of, this general line of research.
STRUCTURE OF THE DATA SET
The basic data set used in our analysis consists of the
composite CAMEL ratings assigned to banks from 1989 to
1995 by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the OCC, and state
banking supervisors. Each CAMEL rating was given fol-
lowing a full-scope, on-site examination. We eliminated
from our sample any ratings associated with targeted or
limited-scope examinations. CAMEL ratings are not always
assigned during such examinations and, if they are, may
not reflect the most up-to-date information about the full
scope of a bank’s activities.
For each CAMEL rating in the sample, we know
the as-of date of the examination (the date as of which the
condition of the bank is assessed), the supervisory entity
that conducted the examination, and the identity of the
bank. We matched each observation to the corresponding
bank’s income and balance sheet data, as reported in the
Report of Condition and Income (the Call Report) maintained
by the bank supervisory agencies, for the quarter prior to
the as-of date of the examination. These Call Report data
will serve as our proxy for the information available from
regulatory reports and other public sources about the
bank’s condition at the time of the examination. 
To assess how quickly the private supervisory infor-
mation from a bank examination decays, we linked each
observation to the CAMEL rating from the previous full-
scope examination for that bank. That is, for each CAMEL
rating in the sample, we know the lagged composite
CAMEL rating as well as the date of the previous full-scope
examination. With this information, we can calculate the time
since the last examination, a key variable in our analysis.11
An overview of this element of the data set appears
in Table 1. The table presents the number of full-scope
bank examinations in our sample from 1989 to 1995,
sorted by the time since the last examination. The number
of examinations per year varies significantly. From about
7,000 examinations in 1989, the sample size drops to just
under 4,000 in 1991 before rising again to over 8,000
starting in 1992. This variation is due to several factors.
During 1990 and 1991, the number of full-scope examina-
tions performed by the FDIC dropped significantly, while
the number of limited-scope examinations rose. Given
that our sample is based on full-scope examinations, this
shift resulted in a sharp decline in the size of the data set.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.
Table 1
NUMBER OF FULL-SCOPE EXAMINATIONS IN A YEAR, SORTED 
BY QUARTERS SINCE LAST FULL-SCOPE EXAMINATION
Quarters 
since Last 
Examination 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1 102 57 20 102 87 79 54
2 911 427 198 625 722 494 321
3 1,347 820 324 805 1,131 952 718
4 1,581 1,057 580 1,037 2,780 3,273 2,704
5 1,191 795 557 601 1,523 1,784 1,932
6 717 463 598 564 623 561 1,034
7 380 251 389 324 342 369 417
8 298 184 324 389 270 397 317
9 188 99 209 371 126 269 244
10 97 41 154 369 114 132 97
11 76 34 129 354 82 57 51
12 58 36 121 364 72 32 23
13-14 38 28 212 750 161 53 18
15-16 8 7 83 640 208 52 8
17 or more 5 7 82 1,029 757 333 74
Total 6,997 4,306 3,980 8,324 8,998 8,837 8,0126F R B N Y  E CONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999
However, following the passage of FDICIA in 1991 with
its requirement for annual full-scope examinations, the
number of examinations in the data set rose significantly.
Looking down the columns for each year, we see
that about three-quarters of the examinations took place
within six quarters of the prior examination. There is a
clear pattern of clustering of lagged examinations at three
to five quarters, particularly in the latter part of the sample
period. This clustering is consistent with the supervisory
goal of ensuring that each bank has an annual full-scope
examination. Finally, there is significant variation across
the years in the share of the sample for which the time
since the last examination was more than twelve quarters.
The early years of the sample contain relatively few such
observations, but their numbers increase sharply during
1992 and 1993 before declining significantly in later years.
This sharp increase most likely reflects the impact of
FDICIA, as the various supervisory agencies made efforts
to examine more banks in response to the requirement for
annual full-scope examinations.12
EMPIRICAL APPROACH: THE OFF-SITE AND 
EXAMINATION MODELS OF CAMEL RATINGS
To explore the question of how quickly private supervisory
information generated during an examination decays, we
develop two empirical models to predict banks’ composite
CAMEL ratings. The first is based on the FIMS model used
by the Federal Reserve for off-site monitoring purposes (see
Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther [1995] for details). Like the
FIMS model, ours uses income and balance sheet data from
banks’ Call Reports to predict composite CAMEL ratings.13
The specific variables included in the model are listed in
Box A. These variables are intended to capture the five
CAMEL rating components as well as other influences—
such as regional factors and the time since the last full-scope
exam—that could help determine the CAMEL rating.
Because the variables used in the model do not incorporate
the information gathered by supervisors through on-site
exams, we call this model the “off-site model.”
We estimated this model for each year in the
sample period.14 The overall fit is quite good with the
R2 goodness-of-fit statistics ranging from 0.50 to 0.70.15
Although the specific variables that enter the model with
statistically significant coefficients differ from year to
year, a core set of variables have consistent signs and are
significant in nearly every year. These variables include
the log of total assets, the equity-to-capital ratio, the
current and lagged ratios of net income to total assets,
the ratio of residential mortgages to total loans, and the
ratio of consumer loans to total loans. The coefficients on
these variables suggest that, all else equal, larger banks,
banks with higher capital and net income ratios, and
banks with higher proportions of comparatively less risky
residential mortgages and consumer loans tend to receive
BOX A: EXPLANATORY VARIABLES USED 
IN THE EMPIRICAL MODELS
CAPITAL ADEQUACY
• equity-to-capital ratio
• four-quarter change in equity-to-capital ratio
ASSET QUALITY
• log of total assets
• four-quarter change in log of total assets
• loan-to-asset ratio
• commercial and industrial loans as share of total loans
• one-to-four-family mortgages as share of total loans
• real estate loans as share of total loans
• consumer loans as share of total loans
• loans past due thirty to eighty-nine days as share of total assets
• loans past due ninety or more days as share of total assets
• nonperforming loans as share of loan loss reserves
• loan loss reserves as share of total loans
• net charge-offs in year before examination as share of total assets
• year-over-year change in net charge-offs as share of total assets
• provisions in year before examination as share of total assets
• year-over-year change in provisions as share of total assets
MANAGEMENT
• interest rate risk exposure (assets minus liabilities that mature or 
reprice in more than five years)
• insider loans as share of total assets
EARNINGS
• ratio of net income to total assets in year before examination 
• net-income-to-assets ratio lagged one year
LIQUIDITY
• cash as share of total assets
OTHER VARIABLES
• dummy variables for quarter in which examination took place 
(Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4)
• dummy variables for bank’s Federal Reserve District
• dummy variables for agency conducting examination 
(Federal Reserve Bank, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or state regulator)
• dummy variables for number of quarters since previous examinationFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 7
better CAMEL ratings. In contrast, banks with higher
loan-to-asset ratios, higher amounts of past due and non-
accrual loans, higher ratios of nonperforming loans to
loan loss reserves, and higher interest rate risk exposures
consistently receive worse CAMEL ratings.
In addition to estimating the off-site model, we
estimated a second model that includes the previous com-
posite CAMEL rating for each bank. Because this model
includes the private supervisory information contained in
these lagged CAMEL ratings, we call it the “examination
model.” The model already contains variables that control
for information from updated regulatory reports, so any
additional explanatory power from the lagged CAMEL
rating is assumed to reflect private supervisory informa-
tion.16 By comparing the ability of the two models to
explain current CAMEL ratings as the age of the lagged
CAMEL rating increases, we can assess how long this super-
visory information provides additional useful information
on the current condition of the bank.
To conduct this comparison, we allow the coeffi-
cients on the lagged CAMEL rating to differ according to
the length of time since the previous examination. In par-
ticular, we divide the observations in each year of the
sample into fifteen distinct categories according to the
time since the previous examination. We then let the
lagged CAMEL rating enter the model with a different
coefficient for each category.17 In this way, we can test how
the explanatory power of lagged CAMEL ratings varies as
the ratings age.18 This approach provides a within-sample
diagnostic, meaning that we can test the explanatory power
of the lagged CAMEL ratings on the same sample of exami-
nations used to estimate the model.
Before presenting our empirical results, it is worth
discussing the role of the fifteen dummy variables reflect-
ing the time since the previous examination. They are
included to capture the effects of any independent factors
that might cause a relationship between the value of the
current CAMEL rating and the time since the last exami-
nation. In that way, we can be assured that the coefficients
on the interacted, lagged CAMEL ratings are capturing
just the influence of the private information from the
previous examination rather than these other factors. In
fact, the hypothesis that these time-related factors are not
meaningful (that is, the coefficients on the dummy vari-
ables are jointly equal to zero) is strongly rejected for each
year in the sample, indicating that there is some indepen-
dent influence of the time since the last examination on the
value of the current CAMEL rating.19
The results of the within-sample diagnostic are
presented in Table 2, which contains the coefficient esti-
mates on the interacted, lagged CAMEL ratings in the
examination model for each year in the sample. The end
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The coefficients are for the independent variables produced by interacting 
the lagged CAMEL ratings with dummy variables reflecting the amount of time 
since the last examination. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. An 
asterisk indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
5 percent level.
Table 2
COEFFICIENTS ON INTERACTED, LAGGED CAMEL RATINGS 
IN THE EXAMINATION MODEL
Quarters 
since Last 
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Percent
Average Coefficients on Lagged CAMEL Ratings, 
Sorted by Time since Last Examination, 1989-95
Relative to Coefficient for Four-Quarter-Old Lagged CAMEL Ratings
Quarters since last examination












of the shading indicates the point at which the lagged
CAMEL rating generally no longer enters the model with
statistical significance and thus ceases to provide useful
information in modeling current CAMEL ratings.
Clearly, this result varies across the sample. For 1989,
1990, and 1995, the lagged CAMEL rating is not signifi-
cant beyond eleven to twelve quarters.20 However, for
the other years, CAMEL ratings older than three years
provide some information regarding the current condition
of the bank.
Although these results indicate that relatively old
CAMEL ratings have explanatory power, further analysis
shows that the value of the private supervisory information
contained in the ratings decays as it ages. This evidence
arises from the size of the coefficients on the lagged
CAMEL ratings in addition to their statistical significance.
Overall, the hypothesis that the coefficients on the lagged
CAMEL ratings are stable across the age categories is
strongly rejected. Furthermore, the size of the coefficients
declines as the age of the lagged CAMEL rating increases,
even while remaining significant. In the context of our
model, smaller coefficients imply that changes in the value
of the lagged CAMEL ratings have less of an impact on the
value of current CAMEL ratings, even though they con-
tinue to provide some explanatory power. As shown in the
chart, although the decline in the size of the coefficients is
not monotonic, there is a general pattern consistent with
the idea that the relationship between lagged and current
CAMEL ratings decays as the age of the lagged CAMEL
rating increases.21 As the chart illustrates, there is a sharp
drop-off in the size of the coefficients once the lagged
CAMEL rating is more than six quarters old, suggesting
that lagged CAMEL ratings have their greatest impact
before they reach this age.
OUT-OF-SAMPLE ANALYSIS
The results discussed thus far all represent a within-sample
analysis of the information content of lagged CAMEL
ratings, where the significance tests are carried out on the
same set of data used to estimate the models. To enhance
our understanding of how the value of private supervisory
information changes over time, we also conduct several
out-of-sample tests; that is, tests of the predictive power of
the lagged CAMEL ratings using data other than those
used to estimate the models. Out-of-sample tests are of
interest for two related reasons.
First, the tests provide a more robust assessment of
a model’s ability to explain current CAMEL ratings. By
using data outside of the estimation sample, we can assess
whether the estimated model is stable over time and across
different sets of observations. In our analysis, this distinc-
tion amounts to asking whether the decay rate of private
supervisory information indicated by the examination
model reflects the particular observations in a given year or
whether the relationship is more general.
Second, out-of-sample tests more closely mirror
the situation facing bank supervisors. Supervisors have
information about recent bank examinations and therefore
can analyze the relationship between lagged and current
CAMEL ratings for those banks. Based partly on this
analysis, supervisors need to infer how quickly the private
supervisory information from other banks is likely to
deteriorate and therefore how quickly these banks need to
be examined. This situation is essentially an out-of-sample
forecasting problem.
To conduct this out-of-sample analysis, we esti-
mate our two models using data from one year and then use
the estimated coefficients to forecast the CAMEL ratings toFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 9
be assigned during the following year. For example, we
estimate the off-site and examination models using the
1989 sample and use the coefficient estimates to forecast
the CAMEL ratings for the examinations in the 1990
sample. This procedure gives us two separate forecasts of
CAMEL ratings for 1990, one based on each model.
To evaluate the quality of these CAMEL rating
forecasts, we need statistical tools that differ from those
used in the within-sample tests of the statistical signifi-
cance of the regression coefficients. The forecasts from the
off-site and examination models are actually probability
forecasts that a bank will receive a CAMEL rating of either
1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. For example, such a forecast might be that
the bank has a 30 percent chance of being rated 2; a 50 per-
cent chance of being rated 3; a 20 percent chance of being
rated 4; and a 0 percent chance of being rated 1 or 5. We
use a standard measure of forecast accuracy, known as the
logarithmic scoring rule (LSR), to evaluate such multistate
probability forecasts. The LSR measure examines how
much weight a model’s forecast places on the outcome that
actually occurred. That is, if the CAMEL rating for a
particular examination was 2, the LSR would assess the
quality of the forecast by looking only at the probability
assigned to that outcome. Under the mathematical assump-
tions used in computing the LSR measure (Box B), smaller
LSR values imply more accurate forecasts.22
The off-site and examination models used in this article are
ordered logit models, which provide probability forecasts for
each of the five possible CAMEL ratings. In mathematical
form, such an out-of-sample forecast, denoted  , is a (5x1)
vector in which the   element represents the forecasted
probability of being in state i. For example, the out-of-sample
forecast might be   = [0; 0.30; 0.50; 0.20; 0]. Accuracy
measures for such forecasts relate the performance of the
forecasts to actually observed outcomes. Let   be an indi-
cator vector such that if the CAMEL rating is i (where i =
1,...,5), then the   element equals one and zero other-
wise. For example, if bank n receives a CAMEL rating of
4, then   = [0; 0; 0; 1; 0].
The accuracy measure used here, known as the loga-
rithmic scoring rule (LSR), examines how much weight the
probability forecast places on the actual outcome. That is, if
the CAMEL rating for a particular examination were 2, the
LSR would assess the accuracy of the forecast only by look-
ing at the probability it assigned to that outcome. The math-
ematical formula for the LSR is
,
where N is the number of banks for which forecasts are gen-
erated. Since   equals one only for the CAMEL rating actu-
ally observed, the LSR is simply the average of the negative,




















observed. LSR can take on values in the interval [0, ] with
smaller values implying greater accuracy.
The LSR measure permits model comparison by
creating performance rankings. For example, if the LSR value
for the probability forecasts from model A (denoted  ) is
smaller than that for the forecasts from model B (denoted
), then model A is said to be more accurate than model
B. However, an important question is whether this observed
difference in LSR values is statistically significant or just an
artifact of the data sample. To examine this point, Diebold
and Mariano (1995) propose several tests for determining
whether the difference is statistically different from zero. 
Generally, the null hypothesis under scoring rule g is
, or equivalently, 
. For LSR,   for a single
observation is
.
To examine this null hypothesis, we simply calculate the
difference between the scores from our two models for each
observation in the sample and regress it against a constant.
If this coefficient is statistically different from zero, then
the aggregate scores for the sample as a whole differ signifi-
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This measure of forecast accuracy permits model
comparison by creating performance rankings. For example,
if the LSR value for the probability forecasts from model A
is smaller than that for the forecasts from model B, then
model A can be said to be more accurate than model B.
However, an important question is whether this observed
difference in LSR values is statistically significant or just
an artifact of the data sample. To examine this point,
Diebold and Mariano (1995) propose several tests for
determining whether the difference is statistically different
from zero. We use a simple variant of one of their sugges-
tions (Box B). Specifically, we calculate the difference
between the scores from our two models for each observa-
tion in the sample. We then regress this difference against
a constant term and test to see whether the constant is
statistically different from zero. This procedure is equiva-
lent to testing whether the aggregate scores for the sample
as a whole differ significantly.
The basic results of the out-of-sample analysis are
presented in Table 3, which contains the comparison of
LSR values for each year of the data set.23 In the early years
of the sample, the LSR values for the examination model
are significantly smaller than those for the off-site model
for examinations up to six to seven quarters old; that is, the
difference between the two values is positive and signifi-
cant. After 1991, this cutoff point increases to ten to
twelve quarters. In other words, the results suggest that
the private supervisory information contained in CAMEL
ratings continues to provide useful information in predict-
ing the current condition of a bank for six to twelve quar-
ters after the previous examination. After this point, there
appears to be little value in the information contained in
the prior CAMEL rating.
Overall, the examination model generates more
accurate forecasts than the off-site model up to a certain
point. An alternative way to express this result is to exam-
ine the models’ integer forecasts of the CAMEL ratings;
that is, the expected CAMEL rating, rounded to the near-
est integer, based on the models’ probability forecasts.
These forecasted CAMEL ratings can then be compared
with the observed CAMEL ratings. For the 1990 data, the
off-site model correctly predicted about 67 percent of the
realized CAMEL ratings for banks that had lagged ratings
up to six quarters old. The examination model improved
this performance by correctly predicting roughly 75 per-
cent of the realized ratings. However, for banks with
older lagged CAMEL ratings, both models perform
equally, with about 40 percent accuracy. For all the years
in our sample, the off-site and examination models
exhibit this difference in forecast performance before the
cutoff point, but not after. Again, this result indicates
that the private supervisory information in lagged
CAMEL ratings from full-scope examinations decays over
time and is not useful in predicting the current CAMEL
ratings after a certain point.24
In fact, some of the results suggest that after a
certain point, using lagged CAMEL ratings to predict cur-
rent ones may actually be detrimental to producing accurate
forecasts. In some instances, the score for the off-site model
is significantly smaller than for the examination model,
indicating that the former produces more accurate forecasts
than the latter. For example, in Table 3, for observations in
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Each figure gives the difference in values for banks examined in that year 
(column) whose lagged CAMEL ratings were of the corresponding age (row). 
The figures represent the difference between the LSR value for the off-site model 
(LSR1) and the LSR value for the examination model (LSR2). A positive 
(negative) value indicates that the examination (off-site) model produces a more 
accurate forecast than the off-site (examination) model. An asterisk indicates 
that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level 
using the specified Diebold-Mariano test. The end of the shading indicates 
the point at which the difference between the LSR values is no longer 
statistically positive.
Table 3
DIFFERENCES IN LOGARITHMIC SCORING RULE VALUES, 
SORTED BY TIME SINCE LAST EXAMINATION FOR THE 


















1 0.167* 0.173* 0.840* 0.189* 0.297* 0.429*
2 0.223* 0.250* 0.119* 0.137* 0.184* 0.307*
3 0.218* 0.215* 0.138* 0.137* 0.202* 0.165*
4 0.160* 0.145* 0.162* 0.103* 0.146* 0.179*
5 0.152* 0.137* 0.101* 0.095* 0.153* 0.151*
6 0.179* 0.130* 0.090* 0.145* 0.278* 0.146*
70 . 0 2 9 * 0.069* 0.076* 0.077* 0.121* 0.129*
8 -0.045* 0.046* 0.025* 0.082* 0.096* 0.097*
9-10 -0.104* -0.061* 0.071* 0.077* 0.076* 0.109*
11-12 -0.177* -0.095* 0.037* 0.083* 0.098* 0.053*
13 or more -0.212* -0.157* -0.030* -0.027* -0.073* -0.073*FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 11
which the lagged CAMEL rating is thirteen or more quarters
old, the off-site model has a significantly smaller LSR in all
but one year in the sample, and thus it provides more accu-
rate predictions of current CAMEL ratings in these years.
These results imply that these aged CAMEL ratings add no
value in assessing a bank’s current condition.
Finally, the results suggest that there is significant
variation over the sample period in the useful life of super-
visory information from prior examinations. This variation
may reflect changes in the condition of the U.S. banking
industry over the sample period. In particular, the private
supervisory information contained in CAMEL ratings
appears to decay more rapidly during the early part of the
sample period, when the U.S. banking industry was experi-
encing financial stress, than during the latter part of the
sample period, when the industry experienced more robust
performance. Because we would expect the condition of
banks to change more rapidly during periods of financial
stress, we would also expect a faster rate of information
decay.
To explore our results further, we divided the data
into subsets according to the initial financial condition of
the bank. Specifically, for each year, we divided the data
sample into observations with lagged CAMEL ratings of
1 or 2 (indicating little reason for supervisory concern at
the time of the previous examination) and observations
with lagged CAMEL ratings of 3, 4, or 5 (indicating mod-
erate to severe degrees of supervisory concern). We then
compared the LSR measures for our CAMEL forecasting
models for each of these subsamples. These results are
reported in Tables 4 and 5.
As Table 4 indicates, the results for the subsample
with lagged CAMEL ratings of 1 or 2 are very similar to
those for the overall sample. The results indicate that the
lagged CAMEL ratings cease to provide useful information
about the current condition of a bank after six to twelve
quarters have elapsed and that this information decays
faster in the early part of the sample, when the U.S. bank-
ing industry was experiencing financial distress. The simi-
larity between these results and the overall results for the
sample is not surprising, since the majority of observations
(between 70 and 90 percent) have lagged CAMEL ratings
of 1 or 2.
As indicated in Table 5, the findings for observa-
tions with lagged CAMEL ratings of 3, 4, or 5 are
considerably different.25 The point at which the lagged
CAMEL rating ceases to provide useful information
regarding the current CAMEL ratings is significantly
earlier than it is for the overall sample.26 The information
in prior CAMEL ratings seems to be no longer useful after
just three to six quarters. Further, the cyclical pattern that
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Each figure gives the difference in values for banks examined in that year 
(column) whose lagged CAMEL ratings were of the corresponding age (row). 
The figures represent the difference between the LSR value for the off-site model 
(LSR1) and the LSR value for the examination model (LSR2). A positive 
(negative) value indicates that the examination (off-site) model produces a more 
accurate forecast than the off-site (examination) model. An asterisk indicates 
that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level 
using the specified Diebold-Mariano test. The end of the shading indicates 
the point at which the difference between the LSR values is no longer 
statistically positive.
Table 4
DIFFERENCES IN LOGARITHMIC SCORING RULE VALUES, 
SORTED BY TIME SINCE LAST EXAMINATION FOR THE 
ONE-YEAR-AHEAD FORECASTS OF CAMEL RATINGS

















1 0.150* 0.252* 0.082* 0.210* 0.158* 0.331*
2 0.147* 0.114* 0.165* 0.131* 0.164* 0.231*
3 0.145* 0.169* 0.112* 0.175* 0.137* 0.150*
4 0.119* 0.108* 0.168* 0.139* 0.136* 0.164*
5 0.133* 0.111* 0.134* 0.118* 0.125* 0.146*
6 0.126* 0.103* 0.111* 0.138* 0.283* 0.141*
7 0.043* 0.048* 0.073* 0.091* 0.160* 0.127*
8 -0.045* 0.028* 0.078* 0.096* 0.105* 0.091*
9-10 -0.058* -0.051* 0.036* 0.085* 0.082* 0.109*
11-12 -0.207* -0.042* 0.008* 0.078* 0.111* 0.086*
13 or more -0.182* -0.109* 0.001* -0.013* -0.049* -0.056*
Our findings suggest that the rate of decay in 
private supervisory information is considerably 
faster for banks experiencing some degree of 
financial difficulty, regardless of the overall 
condition of the banking industry.12 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999
was evident in both the overall sample and in the subsample
with lagged CAMEL ratings of 1 or 2 does not emerge in
these results. Taken together, these findings suggest that
the rate of decay in private supervisory information is con-
siderably faster for banks experiencing some degree of
financial difficulty, regardless of the overall condition of
the banking industry.
What do these results imply for the basic question
motivating this article, namely, how often should a bank
be examined? To answer this question, it is important to
understand that the tests described above provide an
upper-bound for the length of time that prior CAMEL
ratings provide useful information about current bank
conditions. That is, beyond the six-to-twelve-quarter range
is where the lagged CAMEL rating contains no useful
information about the current condition of a bank. In
practice, supervisors would probably wish to examine a
bank before this point, when the private information from
the prior examination continues to have some, though
diminished, value.
Finally, in thinking about the optimal time
between examinations, the results suggest that this horizon
may vary. During periods of financial stress in the banking
industry, the quality of private supervisory information
appears to decay faster than it does in more stable periods,
suggesting that the optimal time between examinations
may be shorter in times of stress. Further, the rate of infor-
mation decay is markedly greater for banks that are them-
selves financially troubled, regardless of the state of the
overall industry. This finding implies, rather sensibly, that
it is desirable to examine troubled institutions more often
than healthy ones, although the optimal examination interval
for any particular bank will vary from the averages dis-
cussed here.27
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To examine the robustness of our results to the choices we
made in setting up the analysis, we conducted two addi-
tional sets of tests. We examined the performance of our
two models on out-of-sample observations, both to test the
robustness of the results and to mirror more closely the
actual situation faced by bank examiners. The approach we
chose—year-ahead forecasts—is only one way of setting up
such an out-of-sample test. As discussed in Granger and
Huang (1997), out-of-sample analysis for models of this
type can also be conducted by holding out a random part of
the sample for a given year and using that holdout sample
for the out-of-sample analysis.28 We use this approach to
test whether the results discussed above are due solely to
the year-ahead forecast analysis. 
Table 6 contains the results of our holdout sample
prediction analysis.29 For each year in the sample, we esti-
mated the two models over a randomly selected 75 percent
of the total sample. These estimated models for each year
were then used to predict the CAMEL ratings on the
remaining 25 percent of the sample. We again compared
the accuracy of these predictions using the LSR measure.
The holdout sample prediction results are broadly
similar to those for the year-ahead forecast analysis. The
examination model exhibits better performance than the
off-site model for observations with CAMEL ratings that
are six to twelve quarters old; that is, the differences in
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Each figure gives the difference in values for banks examined in that year 
(column) whose lagged CAMEL ratings were of the corresponding age (row). 
The figures represent the difference between the LSR value for the off-site model 
(LSR1) and the LSR value for the examination model (LSR2). A positive 
(negative) value indicates that the examination (off-site) model produces a more 
accurate forecast than the off-site (examination) model. An asterisk indicates 
that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level 
using the specified Diebold-Mariano test. The end of the shading indicates 
the point at which the difference between the LSR values is no longer 
statistically positive.
Table 5
DIFFERENCES IN LOGARITHMIC SCORING RULE VALUES, 
SORTED BY TIME SINCE LAST EXAMINATION FOR THE 
ONE-YEAR-AHEAD FORECASTS OF CAMEL RATINGS

















1 0.220* -0.143* 0.089* 0.142* 0.725* 0.771*
2 0.345* 0.377* 0.071* 0.143* 0.215* 0.433*
3 0.365* 0.303* 0.173* 0.071* 0.374* 0.221*
4 0.294* 0.278* 0.142* 0.002* 0.208* 0.305*
5 0.240* 0.275* -0.005* 0.020* 0.321* 0.200*
6 0.568* 0.309* 0.000* 0.112* 0.193* 0.359*
7 -0.091* 0.141* 0.096* -0.072* -0.684* 0.186*
8 -0.049* 0.136* -0.139* -0.060* -0.062* 0.502*
9-10 -0.383* -0.102* 0.152* -0.024* -0.042* 0.133*
11-12 0.223* -0.340* 0.100* 0.154* -0.106* NA
13 or more -0.980* -0.450* -0.160* -0.115* -0.163* -0.391*FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 13
LSR values between the examination and off-site models
are positive and significant for this portion of the holdout
sample. The previously observed cyclical pattern is less
evident, but the results nonetheless provide some indication
that the information in lagged CAMEL ratings decays less
rapidly in the latter years of the sample. The weaker cyclical
pattern may be due to the considerably smaller number of
out-of-sample observations available using this type of
analysis. The smaller sample size reduces the power of the
statistical tests to determine whether the accuracy measures
for the two models differ significantly. Overall, however,
the holdout sample results support the findings of the year-
ahead forecasts, suggesting that our analysis is not overly
sensitive to the structure of the out-of-sample analysis.
For the second set of robustness tests, we focus
directly on the question whether the time between
full-scope examinations can be treated as an exogenous
variable in our two models. We have assumed that the
models capture the relevant explanatory variables used by
examiners in determining CAMEL ratings. However, it
might be the case that in scheduling examinations, super-
visors have additional information—not present in our
empirical specifications—about the extent to which condi-
tions at a bank have changed since the last examination.
Using such information, supervisors might schedule more
frequent examinations for banks whose financial condi-
tions are less stable and less frequent examinations for
those with more stable conditions. In that case, the time
since the last examination would be an endogenous vari-
able, rather than an exogenous one as we have assumed.
That is, the time since the last examination may be a
function of the current CAMEL rating that we are trying
to model. 
Some preliminary evidence in favor of such
endogeneity is presented in Table 7, which shows the
cumulative distribution of the time since the last full-scope
examination in percentage terms. The first column of the
table presents the cumulative distribution for all observa-
tions aggregated across the seven years in the sample, while
the other columns report the results for subsamples divided
by current CAMEL ratings. Clearly, the time between
examinations for banks with CAMEL ratings of 3 to 5 is
shorter than it is for banks with ratings of 1 or 2. About
45 percent of banks with ratings of 1 or 2 had a lagged
full-scope examination within four quarters, compared
with almost 60 percent for banks with ratings of 3 to 5.
Although this difference diminishes as the time between
examinations increases (by eight quarters, the percentages
are nearly equal), it may be the case that the time since the
last examination is a function of the current CAMEL rat-
ing. The existence of such endogeneity might lead our
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Each figure gives the difference in values for banks examined in that year 
(column) whose lagged CAMEL ratings were of the corresponding age (row). The 
figures represent the difference between the LSR value for the off-site model 
(LSR1) and the LSR value for the examination model (LSR2). A positive 
(negative) value indicates that the examination (off-site) model produces a more 
accurate forecast than the off-site (examination) model. An asterisk indicates 
that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level 
using the specified Diebold-Mariano test. The end of the shading indicates 
the point at which the difference between the LSR values is no longer 
statistically positive.
Table 6
DIFFERENCES IN LOGARITHMIC SCORING RULE VALUES 
FOR THE HOLDOUT SAMPLE, SORTED BY TIME 





Examination 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1 0.177* -0.040* 0.226* 0.175* 0.241* 0.229* 0.238*
2 0.224* 0.266* 0.228* 0.179* 0.280* 0.279* 0.150*
3 0.237* 0.195* 0.123* 0.177* 0.178* 0.242* 0.077*
4 0.136* 0.168* 0.100* 0.142* 0.150* 0.113* 0.128*
5 0.104* 0.184* 0.134* 0.215* 0.137* 0.222* 0.141*
6 0.154* 0.237* 0.121* 0.072* 0.145* 0.142* 0.144*
70 . 0 5 7 * 0.121* 0.099* 0.059* 0.093* 0.106* 0.106*
80 . 0 7 0 * 0.135* 0.005* 0.017* 0.049* 0.069* 0.108*
9-10 -0.007* -0.175* 0.053* 0.071* -0.008* 0.058* 0.028*
11-12 0.077* -0.060* -0.038* 0.017* 0.045* 0.144* -0.085*
13 or more -0.057* -0.610* 0.035* -0.008* -0.042* -0.083* -0.069*
FDICIA’s requirement for annual full-scope 
examinations seems reasonable, particularly 
for banks whose initial financial condition is 
troubled or when the banking system as a whole 
is experiencing financial stress.14 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999
empirical tests to overstate the length of time that a lagged
CAMEL rating continues to provide useful information
about the current condition of a bank. 
To test for this possible endogeneity, we use two
distinct methods. First, we use a logistic regression relat-
ing the probability that the CAMEL rating changes (either
upward or downward) to the time between examinations. If
the time between examinations were strictly endogenous,
we would expect to find no significant relationship
between these two variables: supervisors would schedule
examinations at the point when conditions at the bank had
changed sufficiently to warrant a change in the CAMEL
rating. In contrast, if the time between examinations were
exogenous, we would expect to see a positive relationship
between the time since the last examination and the proba-
bility of a change in the CAMEL rating.
The results of this regression are reported in Table 8.
Clearly, the coefficient on the time since the last examination
is positive and significant for each year of the sample.
Although the overall fit of the regressions is poor (the R2
statistics are quite low), these results support the idea that
the time since the last examination is not significantly
endogenous.
To explore this question further, we conducted a
second test that explicitly attempts to control for the endo-
geneity of the time between examinations. We begin this
test by modeling the time since the last examination as a
function of variables that are correlated with it, but not
with the current CAMEL ratings. The fitted values from
this model should therefore be free of this possible endoge-
neity. By substituting these fitted values for the dummy
variables for the actual time since the last examination in
our two earlier models, we expect that the generated
CAMEL rating forecasts will not be affected by any endoge-
neity between the time since the last examination and the
current CAMEL rating. If the LSR results based on these
modified models are found to be similar to those for the
versions that do not control for potential endogeneity, then
this finding would provide additional evidence that such
endogeneity is not influencing our results.30 
In technical terms, we model the time between
examinations using an econometric technique known as
hazard modeling.31 The explanatory variables used in esti-
mating the hazard models were the changes in the core bal-
ance sheet and income statement variables that form the
basis of the off-site and examination models. Although the
levels of these variables are significant determinants of cur-
rent CAMEL ratings, it seems reasonable to assume that
their lagged values, and thus the changes in their values,
are exogenous. After the hazard models have been esti-
mated, they can be used to generate predicted probabilities
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable equals 1 when the CAMEL rating changes 
(increases or decreases) and is zero otherwise. R2 statistics are those derived for 
limited dependent variable models in Estrella (1998). An asterisk indicates that 
the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
Table 8
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS: PROBABILITY OF CAMEL 
RATING CHANGE AS A FUNCTION OF TIME SINCE LAST 
EXAMINATION
















   examination















R2 0.002)* 0.010.* 0.026)* 0.013)* 0.008)* 0.005)* 0.004)*
Number of
   observations 6,998)* 4,306.* 3,980)* 8,324)* 8,998)* 8,837)* 8,012)*
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.
Table 7
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF TIME SINCE LAST 
FULL-SCOPE EXAMINATION







Rating of 1 or 2 
(Percent)
Current CAMEL 
Rating of 3 to 5 
(Percent)
1 1.0 0.9 1.4
2 8.5 6.7 16.2
3 20.8 17.5 35.5
4 47.1 44.7 58.0
5 64.1 62.3 71.8
6 73.3 72.5 76.8
7 78.3 77.8 80.3
8 82.7 82.6 83.3
9 85.8 85.8 85.8
10 87.8 87.8 87.7
11 89.4 89.4 89.3
12 90.8 90.8 90.9
13-14 93.3 93.1 94.2
15-16 95.4 95.1 96.7
17 or more 100.0 100.0 100.0
Memo:
Number of 
   observations 49,455 40,252 9,203FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 15
that the time between examinations falls into specified
ranges. We substituted these predicted probabilities for the
dummy variables representing the actual time since the
last examination.32 
Table 9 presents the LSR comparison results for
the off-site and examination models using the estimated
survivor function for the examinations in each year. The
results are quite similar to those reported in Table 3. In the
early years of the sample, the LSR value for the examina-
tion model is less than the value for the off-site model for
examinations up to six or seven quarters old. After 1991,
this cutoff point increases to roughly nine to twelve
quarters after the examination. The results for the two sub-
samples of CAMEL ratings (not reported in the tables) are
similar to those in Tables 4 and 5. Thus, the out-of-sample
forecast results do not appear to be sensitive to our
attempts to control for the potential endogeneity of the
time since the last examination. Based on these results, as
well as on the logit results reported above, it does not
appear that our conclusions are being driven by an endoge-
nous relationship between the current CAMEL rating and
the time since the previous examination.
CONCLUSION
This article examines the frequency with which supervisors
should examine banks by assessing the decay rate of the
private supervisory information gathered during full-scope
examinations. Such information is costly to obtain since it
can be gathered only during on-site examinations. Thus,
the question of how quickly the information’s value erodes
has important implications for both supervisors and
banks. The more quickly this information decays, the more
frequently examinations need to take place in order for
supervisors to have access to accurate information about the
current condition of banks.
Our results suggest that CAMEL ratings cease to
provide any useful information about the current condition
of a bank after about six to twelve quarters. Thus, examina-
tions should take place at least at this frequency, since
supervisors would probably want to examine a bank while
the information from the previous examination continues
to have some value. Our results indicate that supervisory
information tends to decay more rapidly for banks with
weaker CAMEL ratings (3, 4, or 5). Thus, for these insti-
tutions, a somewhat shorter examination cycle may be
justified. In this light, FDICIA’s requirement for annual
full-scope examinations seems reasonable, particularly for
banks whose initial financial condition is troubled or
when the banking system as a whole is experiencing
financial stress. Of course, the optimal examination fre-
quency for any particular bank can and will deviate from
the average results presented here.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Each figure gives the difference in values for banks examined in that 
year (column) whose lagged CAMEL ratings were of the corresponding age 
(row). The figures represent the difference between the LSR value for the 
off-site model (LSR1) and the LSR value for the examination model (LSR2). A 
positive (negative) value indicates that the examination (off-site) model produces 
a more accurate forecast than the off-site (examination) model. An asterisk 
indicates that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 5 per-
cent level using the specified Diebold-Mariano test. The end of the shading 
indicates the point at which the difference between the LSR values is no 
longer statistically positive.
Table 9
DIFFERENCES IN LOGARITHMIC SCORING RULE VALUES BASED 
ON FITTED HAZARD FUNCTIONS, SORTED BY TIME SINCE LAST 



















1 0.159* 0.143* 0.199* 0.141* 0.279* 0.391*
2 0.236* 0.242* 0.168* 0.059* 0.170* 0.295*
3 0.226* 0.199* 0.172* 0.073* 0.195* 0.179*
4 0.165* 0.146* 0.163* 0.114* 0.150* 0.187*
5 0.155* 0.118* 0.136* 0.100* 0.152* 0.155*
6 0.179* 0.125* 0.138* 0.134* 0.283* 0.189*
7 0.021* 0.064* 0.100* 0.075* 0.144* 0.149*
8 -0.052* 0.013* 0.036* 0.085* 0.095* 0.125*
9-10 -0.124* -0.011* 0.065* 0.075* 0.110* 0.136*
11-12 -0.185* -0.116* 0.031* 0.096* 0.104* 0.141*
13 or more -0.199* -0.070* -0.017* 0.009* -0.088* -0.024*16 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 NOTES
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1. An important qualification to this statement is that the verification
of the accuracy of regulatory reports is one aspect of on-site examinations.
2.  Note that our results reflect the average pattern of information decay
across the examinations in the sample; the optimal examination timing
for individual banks will differ from these averages.
3. Profits in the banking industry fell sharply through the mid-to-late
1980s, reflecting large loan losses in several lending sectors, including
agriculture, energy, developing countries, and real estate. Profits, as
measured by return on equity, did not return to pre-downturn levels
until 1992. Failures also rose sharply during this period, reaching a high
of more than 250 per year in the late 1980s (see Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation [1997]).
4. According to estimates by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the field examination staffs of the three federal bank
supervisory agencies—the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—and the fifty state banking
supervisors totaled about 9,000 in 1994. For more information, see
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997).
5. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997, p. 428).
6. The exception is very small banks with supervisory ratings that
indicate few, if any, significant supervisory concerns; these banks can be
examined once every eighteen months.
7. For example, the Federal Reserve uses the Financial Institutions
Monitoring System (FIMS) for this purpose (see Cole, Cornyn, and
Gunther [1995] for details).
8. The formal name of the rating system is the Uniform Financial
Institutions Rating System, although it is commonly known as the
CAMEL rating system. In 1997, a sixth component was added, reflecting
a bank’s Sensitivity to market risk. The expanded rating system is known
as the CAMELS rating system. Because our data sample extends only
through 1995, none of the examinations in our sample includes this new
component.
9. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (1996) for a
detailed description of the CAMEL rating system and an interpretation
of the component and composite ratings.
10. Bank holding companies are examined separately from their bank
subsidiaries. The BOPEC rating assigned at the conclusion of such an
examination reflects the conditions of the holding company’s Bank
subsidiaries, Other nonbank subsidiaries, Parent company, Earnings, and
Capital adequacy.
11. We focus on the time between full-scope bank examinations, so
banks in our sample may have had either a targeted or limited-scope
examination between full-scope examinations. In such cases, supervisors
will have had the opportunity to update some of their private information
about the bank’s condition. As discussed above, however, such
examinations generally do not result in comprehensive assessments of a
bank’s condition. Therefore, by examining the time interval between
full-scope examinations, we likely obtain the best indication of the time
decay of the private supervisory information.
12. Note that there are a significant number of observations with prior
examinations more than six quarters old, even in 1994 and 1995, well
after the passage of FDICIA, which set an outside limit of eighteen
months between examinations. About 75 percent of the observations
have intervening, limited-scope examinations that occurred within six
quarters of the current examination, suggesting the efforts made by
supervisors to make a full transition to FDICIA’s requirements. Further-
more, the relatively small number of observations during 1989 and 1990
for which the time between examinations is fairly long may partly reflect
the source data used in constructing the data set. Because the source data
contained increasingly sparse information on examinations before 1989,
our data set for 1989 and 1990 excludes examinations of banks whose
previous examinations were not recorded in the source data. 
13. Technically, the statistical approach used is an ordered logit model.
CAMEL ratings have discrete values, so a standard linear regression
model—which assumes that the dependent variable is continuous—
would be inappropriate. The ordered logit model is specifically designed
to handle discrete dependent variables, such as CAMEL ratings, whose
values are ordinally related (that is, 1 implies “strongest performance,”
while 5 implies “weakest performance”). See Maddala (1983) for a
detailed discussion of ordered logit models.
14. We conduct our analysis on annual, cross-sectional data sets, as
opposed to a panel data set, for two reasons. First, a simple likelihood
ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the model coefficients are
constant across the years. Second, because examiners must allocate theirENDNOTES (Continued)
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scarce resources over future examinations, we felt that focusing on year-
ahead CAMEL rating forecasts generated from annual data sets would
more closely mirror examiner behavior.
15. The R2 statistic is the goodness-of-fit measure developed by Estrella
(1998) specifically for limited dependent variable models. The statistic is
roughly analogous to the R2 statistic used in linear regressions because
its value ranges between zero (for a model with no explanatory power) and
one (for a model with complete explanatory power).
16. The information contained in the lagged CAMEL rating reflects
both private supervisory information and past values of the public
information on bank condition. To isolate the effects of the supervisory
information, we also estimated a version of the examination model that
controlled for the publicly available information component. In
particular, we estimated an ordered logit model that regressed lagged
CAMEL ratings on lagged values of the publicly available independent
variables listed in Box A. From this model, we calculated a fitted value
of the lagged CAMEL rating using the predicted probabilities that the
rating was equal to a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. We then subtracted this fitted
value from the actual lagged CAMEL rating. We interpret this residual
as reflecting the information in the lagged CAMEL rating stemming
just from the private supervisory information. We then substituted this
residual for the actual lagged CAMEL rating in the ordered logit
equation for the current CAMEL rating. The results of the subsequent
out-of-sample forecast analysis were nearly identical to those for the
examination model using the actual lagged CAMEL rating, suggesting
that this variable primarily reflects private supervisory information.
17. Using mathematical notation, we can summarize the off-site model








current CAMEL rating for bank i;   is the vector of coefficients on
the independent variables   listed in Box A (except for the indica-
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variables, particularly on the core set of variables, do not significantly
change when the interacted, lagged CAMEL variables are included in the
specification.
18. We also estimated a constrained version of the examination model
in which the coefficient on the lagged CAMEL rating does not vary with
the time since the last examination. Based on a likelihood ratio test, these
constraints are clearly rejected for every year in the sample. This finding
indicates that there is meaningful variation in the coefficients on the
lagged CAMEL ratings as the age of the rating increases. However, as the
out-of-sample forecast results (discussed in the next section) were not
significantly affected by these constraints, our primary results are not
overly sensitive to the way in which the lagged CAMEL ratings enter the
examination model.
19.  Using this model specification, we assume that the time since the
last full-scope examination is an exogenous variable; that is, it does not
depend on the current CAMEL rating. A plausible argument can be made
that the variable is endogenously determined, especially with respect to
lower rated banks. Although we cannot conclusively prove that the
variable is exogenous, we provide indirect evidence later on. We
maintain the assumption throughout the analysis that follows.
20. The coefficient on lagged CAMEL ratings that are seventeen or more
quarters old in the 1989 regression is an exception, since it is statistically
significant.
21. To try to formalize this observation, we test the hypothesis that the
coefficients on lagged CAMEL ratings that were twelve or more quarters
old were smaller than the coefficients on lagged CAMEL ratings that
were four quarters old. (We selected four quarters as being representative
of relatively new CAMEL ratings, but the results are not sensitive to this
choice.) For all cases, the coefficients on the older CAMEL ratings were
smaller than those on the four-quarter-old CAMEL ratings, and these
differences were statistically significant about half the time. In particular,
in all but two of the sample years, at least half the coefficients on the older
CAMEL ratings were significantly smaller. These results lend support to
the more informal observation that the size of the coefficients tends to
decrease as the age of the CAMEL ratings increases.
22. Estrella and Mishkin (1996) recommend using the logarithmic
scoring rule to evaluate probability forecasts derived from models
estimated using maximum likelihood estimation techniques (such as the
ordered logit models used here). The reason for this is that the LSR
mimics the weights used in maximizing the likelihood function to obtain
the parameter estimates.18 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 NOTES
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23. To maximize the power of the Diebold-Mariano test used in the
analysis, we use a higher level of aggregation for the lagged CAMEL
ratings. Specifically, we group into three categories all observations for
which the prior examination occurred nine or ten quarters ago, eleven or
twelve quarters ago, and thirteen or more quarters ago, rather than into
the seven categories used in the ordered logit estimation.
24. We also estimated versions of our model in which we attempted to
assess the impact of limited-scope examinations on these results. Overall,
about 20 percent of the observations in the sample have limited-scope
examinations between the full-scope examinations. The distribution of
these observations is uneven across years and concentrated in 1991 to
1994, the period during which the supervisory agencies were in the
midst of the transition to FDICIA. For this analysis, we substituted the
time since the last limited-scope examination and its associated CAMEL
rating for the time since the last full-scope examination and its CAMEL
rating. The empirical results differ somewhat from the results presented
in Table 3. The adjusted results suggest that the information contained
in lagged CAMEL ratings decays within six to eight quarters, and the
strong cyclical pattern in Table 3 is not evident. The difference in results
may be attributable to the fact that the adjustment for limited-scope
examinations reduces the number of observations with “old” lagged
CAMEL ratings to the point where the statistical tests on this part of the
sample have greatly diminished power. Alternatively, the results could
reflect the fact that limited-scope examinations are not as in-depth as
full-scope examinations and may not produce information of as high a
quality. The difference in our results could reflect the fact that this lower
quality information simply decays faster than the information derived
from full-scope examinations. This interpretation is supported by the
results presented in Table 3, which suggest that the information from
lagged full-scope CAMEL ratings persists even when there has been an
intermediate limited-scope examination. Based on this interpretation, we do
not view the limited-scope results as undercutting our findings about the
persistence of information from full-scope examinations.
25. The subsample of banks with lagged CAMEL ratings of 3, 4, or 5
makes up between 10 and 30 percent of the yearly samples. This smaller
sample size reduces the power of the Diebold-Mariano tests upon which
our results are based, especially for the reduced number of banks with
older CAMEL ratings. However, the sample size for the figures just
beyond the cut-over points (that is, the figures after which our inference
is most relevant) remains large enough to permit valid inference.
26. Note that, for the 1992 results in Table 5, the LSR values for the
examination model are lower than those for the off-site model up to four
quarters since the last examination. There is no clear intuition why this
is also the case at nine to ten quarters. This result is probably due to
random noise in the data set.
27.  In fact, the conclusion that financially troubled institutions should
be examined more frequently is directly incorporated into FDICIA. For
example, the previously noted exception for small banks is disallowed for
banks with CAMEL ratings of 3, 4, or 5. In fact, the eighteen-month
examination window is disallowed, regardless of CAMEL rating, for a
number of reasons related to bank soundness and important changes in
bank control. These additional criteria help ensure that potentially
troubled banks are examined more frequently than healthy ones.
Moreover, the FDICIA-specified intervals between examinations are
meant to be outer limits; bank supervisors have the discretion to conduct
more frequent examinations. The figures in Table 1 suggest that this
discretion is often used.
28. Granger and Huang (1997) distinguish between forecasting, which
involves estimating a model on a set of observations and then applying
these estimates to observations from a future period, and prediction,
which involves estimating a model on a subset of the observations from a
given period and then applying these estimates to other observations
from the same time period. In the discussion in the text, we use these
terms in a manner consistent with these definitions.
29. Because we are no longer using the year-ahead forecast analysis, we
have out-of-sample results for 1989.
30. Note that the use of these fitted values for the time since the last
examination can be viewed, at least in spirit, as an instrumental variable
estimation technique.
31. See Kiefer (1988) for a survey of hazard modeling. For our particular
hazard model, we specify the baseline hazard function as a Weibull
function, which allows the hazard rate (the probability that an
examination occurs in a given quarter after the last examination) to
increase or decrease as the time since the last examination increases. In
our estimates, we found evidence that the hazard rate was increasing,
suggesting that banks were more likely to be examined as the time since
the last examination increased.
32. The hazard model results were used to create variables representing
the probability of an examination occurring one, two, three, four, and
five or more years after the lagged examination. Note that this is a
higher level of aggregation than the one used in the results presented
in Tables 3-5, where fifteen dummy variables were used. The reduction
in the number of time variables was performed to facilitate the estimation
of the ordered logit models used in the analysis. The results are not
sensitive to this reduction.REFERENCES
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